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Is It Time for a Restatement of
Statutory Interpretation?
*

Lawrence M. Solan†
INTRODUCTION
This article suggests that a book that no one has asked for
should not be written. Well, almost. In 2003, appellate lawyer
Gary O’Connor wrote an article suggesting that the American
Law Institute (ALI) compile a Restatement (First) of Statutory
Interpretation.1 O’Connor’s article has been cited in the law
review literature, and downloaded from the Social Science
Research Network more than 1,500 times. This is a good time to
look once again at O’Connor’s suggestion because some recent
developments in the field of statutory interpretation suggest a
growing convergence, notwithstanding embattlement on a few
well-studied issues.
Three developments lead to this reason for optimism.
First is the excellent work of Abbe Gluck, who has argued
persuasively that there is quite a bit of consensus on how to go
about statutory interpretation, especially in the state courts, where
most of the statutory interpretation occurs.2 The acrimonious
debates between Justice Antonin Scalia and his detractors over the
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation sometimes
obscure the significant amount of agreement that does exist.
Second, there is the work of Scalia himself. He and Bryan Garner
have published a book, Reading Law, that reads like a traditional
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legal treatise, bold face and all.3 Is there enough coherence for
it to form the basis of a description of standard methodology in
statutory interpretation? The authors surely intend it to be so.
And third, some scholars in substantial disagreement with
Scalia and his textualist methods have observed that despite
appearances, most everyone is in agreement about what to
consider in interpreting statutes. Moreover, the most dramatic
area of disagreement—the use of legislative history as evidence
of legislative intent—rarely plays anything resembling a
dispositive role in determining cases. It would be difficult to
identify a single judge who routinely uses legislative history to
trump a statute’s plain language.
This article describes these positions and in each case
argues that there is less consensus than meets the eye. It
concludes that absent actual agreement on both method and
results in a large body of cases, a Restatement of Statutory
Interpretation would enable judges to create the illusion of
certainty in a world in which they have more discretion than
they are comfortable acknowledging. The article further
comments on why other Restatements—the Restatement of
Contracts in particular—can better avoid some of these pitfalls.
I.

CONSENSUS ABOUT CONSENSUS IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

Notwithstanding vibrant disagreement about a few issues,
especially the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation,4
the literature shows more and more acknowledgement of what
various positions have in common. Judge Frank Easterbrook came
close to acknowledging this growing consensus about consensus in
his foreword to Scalia and Garner’s book: “Professional norms—
including norms about interpretive method—produce much more
consensus than would be expected if judges’ decisions mirrored the
disagreement in legislative bodies or political debates.”5

3 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
4 Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998) (anti-history), with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (pro-history).
5 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at

xxiv. The consensus is not complete, as Easterbrook acknowledges. He goes on to
suggest that there would be more consensus if Scalia and Garner’s methods were “more
widely followed.” Id. Of course, consensus would also increase if Scalia and Garner’s
methods were more widely rejected in favor of another method.
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William Eskridge’s review of Scalia and Garner begins
with a similar observation:
[Scalia’s] judicial opinions, speeches, articles, and books have generated
great debates, which have (ironically) revealed a substantial consensus
about the ground rules for statutory interpretation. Thus, virtually all
theorists and judges are “textualists,” in the sense that all consider the
text the starting point for statutory interpretation and follow statutory
plain meaning if the text is clear. However, Justice Scalia’s new book,
coauthored with linguist Bryan Garner, reveals that virtually all
theorists and judges are also “purposivists,” in the sense that all believe
that statutory interpretation ought to advance statutory purposes, so
long as such interpretations do not impose on words a meaning they will
not bear. And virtually all theorists and judges insist that statutory
context is important in discerning the meaning of statutory texts.6

I have made similar points in my own writing,7 as has
Jonathan Molot.8
The strongest evidence of consensus in statutory
interpretation comes from Abbe Gluck’s study of state court
interpretive decisions.9 With respect to the Supreme Court of the
United States, she argues, contrary to the writers mentioned
above, that there is no consensus about interpretive
methodology.10 Nor is there agreement on the methods of
interpretation from state to state. Nonetheless, in a careful study of
five states, Gluck shows serious efforts from both courts and
legislatures to create hierarchies of interpretive instruments
designed to bring uniformity to the state’s interpretive
methodology. Her analysis suggests that it is possible for a
common-law based legal system to take statutory interpretation
seriously, and to develop methods that will be generally followed.
Sometimes these methods come from the legislature, sometimes
from the courts. Sometimes there is tension between the two
branches. Nonetheless, in example after example, Gluck shows
that once a methodology has been established, it is typically
followed by the courts. Even those judges who do not agree with it
nonetheless reluctantly apply the methodology.

6 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons,
(reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3), 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013).
7 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION 51 (2010) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between these
camps during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate agree
upon almost everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”).
8 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
36-48 (2006).
9 Gluck, supra note 2.
10 Id. at 1765-66.
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To take one example, in 2004 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin articulated a methodology of modified textualism,11
which remains good precedent today. Basically, courts are to
consider the language of the statute in context, and not to look
to extrinsic sources absent a finding of ambiguity. Once
ambiguity is discovered, however, it is fair game for courts to
look to legislative history and other extrinsic sources of
information about the statute’s purpose and the legislature’s
intent. Only after failing to resolve the ambiguity at that stage
do substantive canons of construction come into play, largely as
tie-breakers.
Scalia and Garner are themselves more combative in
their tone than the remarks of Easterbrook or Eskridge would
suggest. They conceptualize their volume in terms very much
in the tradition of the American Law Institute’s Restatements of
the law. They say: “We believe that our effort is the first modern
attempt, certainly in a century, to collect and arrange only the
valid canons (perhaps a third of the possible candidates) and to
show how and why they apply to proper legal interpretation.”12 To
be sure, the book unfolds as a description and defense of Scalia’s
brand of textualism, and an out-and-out rejection of competing
approaches, such as purposivism and consequentialism.
Nonetheless, the book contains a great number of
generalizations that would be considered acceptable generally,
even by the authors’ opponents. Among them is that courts
typically turn first to a statute’s language in determining its
application;13 that purpose nonetheless matters in resolving
vagueness and ambiguity;14 that vagueness is far more
commonplace than ambiguity as the source of interpretive
problems;15 that stare decisis applies to statutory decisions;16 and
that even easy cases require interpretation, although the
interpretation is so obvious that the interpretive process is often
not apparent.17 Moreover, while Scalia and Garner would give
principles such as the rule of lenity18 and the avoidance of
constitutional problems19 higher priority than they would
11 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County (In re Criminal
Complaint), 681 N.W.2d 110, 122-27 (Wis. 2004).
12 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 9 (footnote omitted).
13 Id. at 56-58.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 31-33.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Id. at 53-55.
18 Id. at 296-302.
19 Id. at 247-51.
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purpose, their tool box is not very different from that of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, putting aside the eschewal of
legislative history as a legitimate source of information for
statutory interpretation.
Thus, while there is not total consensus about statutory
interpretation, there appear to be mainstream views, shared
even among people who disagree with one another on some
basic issues. These views put language first, then consider the
statute’s purpose, apply stare decisis, engage various canons of
construction, and so on.
I do not mean to trivialize the differences, such as the
use of legislative history and the point in the analysis in which
purpose comes into play. However, the passion concerning
debate over legislative history, to my mind, exceeds its doctrinal
importance.20 It is easy enough to find cases in which legislative
history is used to lend additional support to a position justified in
part on other grounds, especially linguistic grounds. It is difficult,
in contrast, to find cases in which a court uses legislative history
to justify a reading that the language of the statute does not
permit. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,21 decided in
1892, is often brought out as the poster child for such practices.22
But that case is now more than 120 years old. Should it not by now
have spawned at least a single poster grandchild? There appears to
be enough in common, even among those who disagree, to take
seriously the possible benefits of restating the law as it exists now,
with forthright acknowledgement of those areas of disagreement.
That is what Gary O’Connor suggested a decade ago. Let us look at
the arguments in support of such a project.

SOLAN, supra note 7, chapter 3.
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (relying in part on legislative history in
determining that a statute prohibiting the payment of transportation into the United
States of a person performing “labor or service of any kind” does not apply to a church’s
paying the expenses of its new clergyman moving from London to New York).
22 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 89 (2006). I do not agree with the position that
Holy Trinity Church illustrates the triumph of history over language. Rather, I have
argued that the case is better explained as a classic application of the ordinary
meaning canon. See SOLAN, supra note 7 at 54-55.
20
21
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II.

THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF A UNIFIED APPROACH TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A.

Statutory Interpretation by Treatise

Gary O’Connor’s 2002 article advocating for a Restatement
of Statutory Interpretation23 observes that common law principles
of statutory interpretation are not likely to yield consistent results
even within the same court, are less likely to yield consistent
results across courts within a jurisdiction, and are still less even
likely to do so across different court systems in different
jurisdictions.24
O’Connor proposes that the American Law Institute
publish a Restatement as a solution to all of the chaos in
statutory interpretation. His main argument that such a
project would likely be successful is by analogy with the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which contains many sections
dealing with the interpretation of authoritative legal texts. These
include issues such as the relevance of the intent of the parties,25
the use of extrinsic evidence to determine intent,26 and a
hierarchy of evidentiary proof.27 The issues are not precisely
the same as those facing statutory interpreters, but the
analogous provisions are surely pertinent.28
Quoting a suggestion made by Peter Strauss, O’Connor
wisely suggests that the new Restatement not be based on the
most contentious of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court,
but rather on an assessment of ordinary practice.29 As for the
question of legislative history, which has remained a matter of
strong disagreement among scholars and judges alike, O’Connor
O’Connor, supra note 1, at 334.
Id. at 336.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
26 Id. at § 213.
27 Id. at §§ 219–22.
28 For
comparison of the jurisprudence of statutory and contractual
interpretation, see Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and
its Implication for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998).
29 O’Connor, supra note 1 at 354. Interpretive practices in contexts other
than the U.S. Supreme Court have recently generated attention in the academic
literature. For discussion of statutory interpretation in state courts, see Gluck, supra
note 2; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479
(2013); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
For discussion of statutory decisions in the lower federal courts, see Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts
of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 (2005).
23
24
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presents several alternative approaches, the most promising of
which is to acknowledge the disagreement and to write the
relevant Restatement sections in the alternative.30
Along similar lines, but with an entirely different
institutional perspective, Nicholas Rosenkranz has proposed
unifying the principles of statutory interpretation through
legislation that would enable the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, much along the lines of other federal
rules, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.31
Rosenkranz has more to say about why this is the right
institutional distribution than he does about what such a set of
laws should actually say, although he does suggest some
especially contentious areas that would benefit from a uniform
set of rules of interpretation.
O’Connor and Rosenkranz both recognize that common
law reasoning is not likely to bring uniformity to statutory
interpretation. There are too many judges saying too many things,
and too much room for judges to make choices in their decision
making that lead to inconsistent results. O’Connor, though,
presents a number of reasons for preferring a Restatement to a set
of federal rules, many of which have persuasive force. The most
practical one is perhaps the most powerful: adoption of a set of
federal rules requires the cooperation of all three branches of
government, making it unlikely to happen absent the perception of
some compelling reason.32 It is not likely that both houses of
Congress perceive such a compelling reason. Moreover, a set of
federal rules is just that: federal. A Restatement, in contrast,
may be used by state and federal courts alike.33
Enter Scalia and Garner, who refer to their book as a
treatise. And a treatise it is. The book is an effort to restate
what is important in the realm of statutory interpretation for
lawyers, judges, and academics alike. For the past century, the
treatise on statutory interpretation that has been recognized as
most complete is J.G. Sutherland’s 1891 treatise, Statutes and
Statutory Construction,34 the seventh edition of which was edited
O’Connor, supra note 1, at 355.
Nicholas Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085 (2002).
32 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 356-57.
33 Id. at 356.
34 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INCLUDING A
DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE
FORMS OF LEGISLATION AND TO LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: TOGETHER WITH AN EXPOSITION
AT LENGTH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND COGNATE TOPICS (1891).
30
31
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by Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer in 2007.35 In
saying this, I mean no disrespect for the many books published on
statutory interpretation over the years.36 But most, like
Eskridge’s Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,37 have as their
principal goal the defense of a particular perspective on the
subject, necessarily omitting a great deal of doctrine that is
important to practitioners and judges, but not central to the
debates in which the particular book engages.
Scalia and Garner have broader aspirations for their book,
which is replete with bold-faced print and examples illustrating
each of the 57 doctrines they espouse and the 13 they reject. Their
goal is to provide the first new reference book in a century for those
engaged in statutory interpretation. What influence their book will
have remains to be seen. What is clear now, however, is that
Reading Law contains a great many controversial claims scattered
among those about which there is relative consensus, as the
perceptive review by Eskridge38 demonstrates.
B.

What Should a Restatement Say?

I do not wish to devote much space here to what a
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation should include. Suffice it
to say that there is enough consensus about the interpretation of
laws to make it clear that there would be plenty to say that is not
enormously controversial. An ALI committee would be
responsible for structuring the project. That task should be
doable. For example, O’Connor suggests a table of contents for the
Restatement, and Scalia and Garner have an actual table of
contents, which organizes their discussion of the issues. It is
instructive to compare the two in order to see how much they
have in common.
35 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2010). For discussion of the history of this treatise, including
interesting biographical information about Sutherland, see O’Connor, supra note 1, at 340-44.
36 For an example of a recent excellent book that refers to much of the
relevant literature, see KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
INTERPRETATION (2013). For a very nice summary of the various canons and principles
intended for students but useful to others, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2006).
37 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
My own book, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES, supra note 7, is limited in this same way:
It discusses those documents relevant to its main arguments, especially the centrality
of intent in statutory interpretation. Taking views quite at odds with those of Eskridge
is VERMEULE, supra note 22. It, too, focuses on those doctrines germane to the book’s
chief argument, which is relatively better competence of the administrative state to
make interpretative decisions now delegated to judges.
38 See Eskridge, supra note 6.
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O’Connor’s proposed Restatement would begin with
language-internal principles, shift to external considerations,
and subsequently present principles applicable to different kinds
of legislation.39 Scalia and Garner, in contrast, organize their
canons around principles applicable to all texts, and principles
applicable to government prescriptions. The former consist largely
of grammatical canons, contextual canons, and what they call
basic principles, the most important of which is principle of the
primacy of language. The latter consist largely of substantive
canons relating to government action, such as the rule of
constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity, and canons that
deal with such questions as retroactivity, private rights of
action, and repeal by implication.
O’Connor’s proposal is organized somewhat less
conceptually than Scalia and Garner’s book, but the substantial
overlap in coverage is obvious. If one compares O’Connor’s
suggested list of topics with the table of contents in Scalia and
Garner’s book, one will not find a sense of controversy over what
should be covered in a treatise that attempts to treat statutory
interpretation thoroughly.
With this level of agreement about what should be
covered, and with Scalia and Garner taking positions that are
sufficiently controversial to render their book inappropriate as
a substitute for a Restatement whose content is vetted and
debated by people with different perspectives, it would seem
that a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation is a good idea.
And to that extent, it is a good idea. At the very least it can
serve to separate the great deal that is agreed upon from the
39 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 354:
Chapter I: Intrinsic or Grammatical Aids to Interpretation
Chapter II: Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation
Chapter III: Interpretive Presumptions—General
Chapter IV: Interpretation of Repealing Acts, Amending Acts, and Acts
Incorporating Other Statutes
Chapter V: Interpretation of Consolidating and Codifying Acts
Chapter VI: Interpretation of Particular Kinds of Statutes
§ 601
Appeals, Statutes Authorizing
Statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed.
§ 602
Deportation, Statutes Authorizing
Ambiguities in deportation statutes are to be construed in
favor of aliens.
§ 603
Penal Statutes
Punitive sanctions are not to be applied if there is ambiguity
as to underlying criminal liability or penalty.
§ 604
Tax Statutes
Exemptions from federal taxation are to be construed
narrowly.
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controversial issues that remain in contention, articulating
both sides in the latter case.
III.

WHERE A RESTATEMENT CANNOT HELP AND MAY DO
HARM

In this section, I express concerns about creating a
Restatement. In evaluating my arguments, one should keep in
mind the legitimate purposes that such a project might serve.
My doubts about creating a Restatement summarizing the
world of intellectual harmony in the arena of statutory
interpretation described above is not whether there is enough
agreement to summarize; it is not even whether the
disagreements are so passionate that there can be no resolution
at the margins. Rather, the real problem with supporting an
effort to restate this field is that someone might actually read it.
The field is so politicized that an authoritative, black letter text
is likely to be used by judges as yet more cover for the positions
they wish to take in close cases.
Here I present three basic reasons for why so many
legal actors, even those with different political orientations, can
agree on how to interpret statutes generally, but not agree on the
resolution of particular cases. First, and most importantly, people
can agree on the principles of interpretation, but disagree on what
weight to give each consideration in a particular case. There is no
agreed-upon set of principles setting such priorities, although
Cass Sunstein attempted to develop a hierarchy many years ago,40
Einer Elhauge41 has done so more recently, and both Gluck42 and
Eskridge43 address the issue to at least some extent. Second, as a
number of researchers (including Scalia and Garner) have noted,
most statutory cases are about vagueness—the accordion-like
nature of concepts that can be construed at various levels of
generality and abstraction (“use a firearm” for example). It is very
difficult to come up with a predictive rule or set of rules that will
predict results in such cases. Third, one can interpret language
either in terms of the outer boundaries of a statutory term, or
in terms of ordinary usage. Judges vacillate between the two
40 See
generally CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990).
41 See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008).
42 Gluck, supra note 2 devotes much of her article to describing the competing
priorities that various states assign to the various interpretive methods.
43 See Eskridge, supra note 6 (commenting on the various roles that
language, purpose and canons should play under a reasonable interpretive regime).
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approaches, and there is no reason to expect them to stop. I
deal initially with the first of these issues, and then with the
second two in combination.
A.

Not Knowing When to Talk about What

More than 60 years ago, Karl Llewellyn observed that
judges appear to pick and choose among canons of construction,
often selecting a canon that leads to one result, instead of
selecting an equally available canon that would have led to the
opposite result.44 His “thrust and parry” table of canons45 is still
widely cited today.46 For the most part, the selective use of
canons should not be troubling when there is general
uniformity in the manner of selection. Judge Posner likens
their use to the use of proverbs. Generally, no one gets upset at
the fact that we use them to tell people to hurry up (“a stitch in
time saves nine”) and to slow down (“haste makes waste”).47 We
take them for granted as rules of thumb that should be used
sensibly in context. Taken that way, they work pretty well. But
if you are trying to get on a New York subway car and the
doors close right in front of you, “haste makes waste” really is
the wrong thing for someone to say to you.
Posner may go a little too far in his analogy because
while canons are in a sense proverbial, they are also robed with
authority: They typically come from the analysis presented by
appellate courts as justification for their interpretation of a
statute whose application is in dispute. Yet their sheer number
makes it difficult to take the canons’ authority seriously. Thus,
when Gluck speaks of “methodological stare decisis,” she refers
more to fairly broad decisions about the relative roles of a
statute’s language, exploration into its purpose using legislative
history and other extrinsic information, and the canons taken as a
whole, than to the obligation to choose one canon over another.48
Scalia and Garner get it right in their third canon of
construction, which they list among the “fundamental principles”
of statutory interpretation: “No canon of construction is absolute.
44 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395 (1950).
45 Id. at 401-06.
46 The article was cited in law reviews 20 times in 2012, and 25 times in 2013. As of
that date, Lexis lists 595 citations to the article, dating back to 1982. Obviously, the 32 years
prior to Lexis’s coverage period contains many more citations.
47 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 280 (1993).
48 Gluck, supra note 2, at 1772.
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Each may be overcome by differing principles that point in other
directions.”49 To them, this problem can be solved, at least in large
part by the principle that language almost always trumps any
extrinsic evidence of legislative meaning, and the principle that
the purpose of a statute is relevant, but is to be derived only
from the language of the statute itself.
It is here that things begin to collapse, more or less in
the way the legal realists said they would. Take the case of
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon,50 discussed by Scalia and Garner,51 and a focal point of
Eskridge’s review of that book.52 In that case, the U.S.
Department of the Interior, pursuant to authority granted under
the Endangered Species Act, had issued regulations to protect
endangered species, including the northern spotted owl. The
statute made it illegal to “take” an endangered species,53 and
included the word “harm” in the definition of “take.”54 The
regulation then defined “harm” as including habitat modification
“where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding, or sheltering.”55 In everyday English, damage to an
animal’s habitat is a far cry from “taking” the animal, which
generally means killing the animal. The conflicting opinions—
Stevens for the majority upholding the regulation, Scalia for the
dissent—read like the last round of a boxing match in which
the two fighters have remained standing, but have thrown and
absorbed all of the punches that their strength and endurance
would allow.
The majority relied on, among other things, the Chevron
doctrine (giving deference to the agency to whom regulatory
authority has been delegated),56 the statutory definition,57 the
purpose of the statute (stated in the text of the law itself),58 the
rule against surplusage,59 the legislative history,60 the language
49
50

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 59.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687

(1995).
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 300-02.
Eskridge, supra note 6, at 536-38.
53 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994).
54 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
55 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
56 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 866 (1984).
57 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 703 (1995).
58 Id. at 697-98.
59 Id. at 698.
51
52
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of the legislated definitions,61 and the structure of the statute as
reflected in the role of various provisions.62 The dissent relied on
dictionary definitions,63 the enactment history (the order in
which various provisions were introduced),64 the consequences to
loggers of upholding the regulation,65 the structure of the statute
as reflected in the role of various provisions, and grammatical
canons of construction, especially noscitur a sociis.66
Putting aside the use of legislative history, there is
really little or no controversy about the legitimacy of the
canons used by both sides. Yet the opinions, taken together, look
like an advertisement for Llewellyn’s position, now about twothirds of a century old. One can reduce much of the disagreement
to politics. Scalia begins his dissent by lamenting the plight of the
logger; Stevens focuses on the congressional policy of saving
endangered species. If deference to the interpretation of
statutes by regulatory agencies were every judge’s priority, this
would have been an easy case for the majority position. Even if
the agency did not adopt the best interpretation of the statutory
language, it certainly is a possible interpretation, to which
deference would be due if deference were the most important
interpretive value. The dissent, in contrast, offered some
compelling arguments about the structure of the statute,
including the fact that the statute specifically offers remedies
that do not include the banning of logging.
But it is not good enough to claim that this case is really
about taking Chevron seriously. Let us say that a Restatement
adopts Adrian Vermeule’s proposal to increase deference to
agencies and decrease the discretion of judges more or less across
the board.67 Empirical research shows that judges apply the
doctrine of deference to administrative agencies differentially,
depending upon whether the current president is of the same
party that was in power when the judge was appointed to the
bench. It is not that the system is corrupt to the core. Rather,
judges, like the rest of us, have a tendency to give the benefit of
the doubt to positions that they find attractive. On the margins,

Id. at 705-06.
Id. at 697-98 n.10.
62 Id. at 702-03.
63 Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 729-31.
65 Id. at 714.
66 Id. at 720-21 (a canon calling for the meanings of words in a list to be
construed as consistent with its neighboring words).
67 VERMEULE, supra note 22.
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then, it matters who the judges are in such cases.68 The game is
an easy one to play: declare an agency action (typically a
regulation) unambiguously outside the scope of the statute
empowering the agency to regulate in order to strike it down, or
declare the empowering statute ambiguous or murky with respect
to the agency action in order to uphold the agency. In Babbitt,
Scalia never came out and said that the statutory language
unambiguously precluded the agency action. But he came as
close as he could to saying it by focusing on the everyday uses
of the statutory language, notwithstanding congressional
definitions broadening the scope of the terms.
If Babbitt illustrates the application of the Chevron
doctrine to uphold a regulation in the teeth of instrumentalist
arguments for why the regulation was a bad idea, MCI v. AT&T69
illustrates the application of the Chevron doctrine to strike down a
regulation in the teeth of fairly good linguistic arguments in
support of its validity. A provision of the Federal Communications
Act requires telephone companies to publish all of their tariffs
regularly.70 Because there were so many tariffs, and because they
changed regularly to meet changing market conditions, this
requirement was sufficiently burdensome that it could potentially
act as a market barrier, making it more difficult for new entrants
in the telecommunications industry to succeed. The statute also
authorizes the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
“modify” this requirement.71 The FCC did just that, by exempting
small carriers from the publication requirement.
AT&T cried foul, claiming that the authority to “modify”
the requirement did not include the authority to eliminate it for
a group of carriers. A divided Supreme Court agreed with AT&T,
and struck down the regulation as exceeding the agency’s
authority. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied heavily
on dictionary definitions of “modify” that supported his position
that only small changes can be considered modifications. A

68 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1104 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 826 (2006). For an empirical study outside the realm of the Chevron doctrine
expressing a similar account, see James Brudney & Cory Ditslear, The Warp and Woof
of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and
Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009).
69 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
70 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2013).
71 Id. 203(b)(2).
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dictionary definition that tended to support a broader reading,
and relied upon by the dissent, was dismissed as “peculiar.”72
The dictionary analysis did not do a very good job here.
It is entirely possible to make relatively minor changes to a
rule by eliminating its application to a small group to whom it
would otherwise apply. A high school, for example, may require
all students to eat lunch on campus, and then “modify” the
requirement to permit graduating seniors to eat lunch off
campus in their last month of school.
Looking at these two cases together, one might ask:
What is the relative strength of the Chevron doctrine and the
choice of dictionaries used to determine the clarity of an agency’s
regulatory authority? And what is the relationship between the
value of keeping coherent a statute’s overall structure and
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a law? And how much
should the economic consequences of a regulation play into the
analysis of what is reasonable? And where does the purpose of
a statute enter the analysis?
Assuming that all of these considerations—among the
others brought out by the various opinions in these cases—are
legitimate ones, and I believe they are, it will never be possible
to come up with a hierarchy that will rank all of the
considerations in such a way as to have the ranking apply across
a broad range of cases. This is because various factors can be
stronger or weaker from case to case and judges require enough
flexibility to take this into account. For example, the strong
statement of statutory purpose in the Endangered Species Act,73
while not an important factor to the dissenters, played a significant
role in the majority opinion, reinforcing its conclusion that the
language of the statute permitted such regulation under a
reasonable interpretation.74 Had the statutory language been the
same, but the stated purpose of the law was to limit interference
with the development of the logging industry, the relative
weightings may well have been different for some of the justices.
This point is a serious one. For if there can never be
consensus about the weight to assign various factors in deciding
a case, then there can be no consensus to restate in a
Restatement. The consensus discussed earlier is at a more
general level of analysis: language trumps purpose, the rule of
MCI, 512 U.S. at 227.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
74 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 698 (1995).
72
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lenity should be applied one way or another, interpretations that
make the code more coherent are to be preferred over
interpretations that make the code less coherent, and so on. But
when it comes to the details, it all falls apart.75 As Babbitt
illustrates, the discussion never even reaches enough coherence
to call it disagreement. Rather, the disagreement is over ad hoc
weightings of factors whose relevance in legal analysis is
largely undisputed, but whose role in an individual case can be
likened to a hockey puck in a face-off at center ice.
B.

Why Determining Word Meaning is Too Hard to Restate

It is not unusual to speak of a statute’s meaning, but
determining meaning is not really the task at hand in statutory
interpretation. What judges do in deciding statutory cases is to
make a judgment about whether a law applies to the facts of a
case and, if so, how it applies. Characterizing the meaning of a
term may help in performing that task, but it is not necessary in
principle. A judge deciding whether driving under the influence
qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of interpreting a law
that defines that term as a criminal act that includes physical
force or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”76 need not define the
word “otherwise” to reach a decision.77 Moreover, it is not the
least bit easy to define even the most ordinary-seeming words.
The reader might try to define the verb “paint” as a thought
experiment and note the difficulties encountered.78
Most cases of word meaning are about borderline
situations, or vagueness.79 Certainly most of the classic cases in
American legisprudence are cases of vagueness: Should an
airplane count as a vehicle with respect to applying a statute
75 Others observe similarly. See Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative
Intent 260 (2012).
76 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B) (2013).
77 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Actually, the Supreme Court
did rely, at least in small part, on a dictionary definition of “otherwise” in that case, but
could have shed the reference without any serious compromise in its reasoning. Id. at
144. For discussion, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries, in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 553-54 (2013).
78 This fact has been observed by philosophers of language. For a seminal
work, see J.A. Fodor et al., Against Definitions, 8 COGNITION 263, 339 (1980).
79 This observation is important, but not new. See SOLAN, supra note 7, ch. 3.
For that matter, Scalia and Garner make this point. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
3, at 31-33.
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enacted in 1919?80 Does a minister perform labor?81 Does the
ordinary meaning of “use a firearm” include trading an unloaded
machine gun for some drugs?82
How should courts resolve these cases? By definition,
the language is not dispositive. In all of these cases, it is possible
to answer the question affirmatively, but there is reason to
question whether the enacting legislature would have wished
the statute to apply to such outlying situations. The problem
has been observed since Aristotle:
[E]very law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters
about which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms.
Where it is necessary to speak in general terms but impossible to do
so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the
majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all.
The law, indeed, is none the less correctly laid down because of this
defect; for the defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in
the nature of the subject matter, being necessarily involved in the
very conditions of human action.83

But Aristotle’s solution is easier to state in general terms than
it is to apply in particular cases. How can one determine which
situations fit within the law’s contemplation, and which do not?
The U.S. Supreme Court makes significant use of the
ordinary meaning canon, which says that the courts should
assume the legislature to have expected statutory terms to be
construed in their ordinary sense.84 However, while courts
sometimes apply this canon, at other times they do not, opting
instead for a broader reading, based on their assessment of how
well the ordinary meaning captures the intent of the legislature.
Smith v. United States is such an example. The Court decided
that using a gun as an item of barter counts as “using a firearm”
for statutory purposes, albeit an unusual use of a firearm.
An even stronger illustration is Chisom v. Roemer,85 a
1991 case interpreting a section of the Voting Rights Act. The
act required states to hold elections in such a way as not to
afford protected classes less opportunity “to elect representatives
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1931).
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
82 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993).
83 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5, ch. 10 (F. H. Peters trans., 5th
ed. 1893) (c. 384 B.C.E.). For discussion, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES,
PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 42-48 (2003).
84 See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Small v.
United States, 544 U.S. 385, 406 (2005); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. at 242
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
85 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1991).
80
81
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of their choice.”86 In this case, citizens complained that a state’s
electoral scheme for electing judges made it more difficult to
elect African American judges.87 Both the history and purpose of
the statute strongly suggest that the legislature had no reason
to limit this rule’s application to prototypical representatives,
that is, legislators. On the contrary, it would almost appear to be
a cruel rejection of the legislation’s goals for a court to determine
that Congress sanctioned the racist election of local judges
when it enacted the statute.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
however, the ordinary meaning of “representative” surely does not
include judges.88 We do not think of judges as representatives. So
the question was whether the court should stretch the meaning of
“representative” beyond its ordinary meaning to include judges,
and that is exactly what the Court did. Such interpretive
dilemmas illustrate more than a conflict among canons of the sort
Llewellyn presented. These conflicts reflect serious disagreement
over the nature of word meaning itself, making consistency in
decision making especially difficult to achieve.
Even when there is general agreement over the method
of finding the meaning of a statute, there is no agreed-upon
way of finding that meaning in individual cases. An excellent
example comes forward in Judge Posner’s review of Scalia and
Garner’s book89 (minus the vitriol that ensued). Scalia and
Garner praise a state court judge in Massachusetts for
concluding that a shopping center’s leasing space for a Mexican
restaurant serving tacos, burritos, and quesadillas would not
violate its obligations to Panera under a lease that, which
prohibited the landlord from leasing space to a business, 10% of
whose projected revenue would consist of the sale of sandwiches.90
Scalia and Garner praise the judge not for the result of the case,
but for having decided the case by looking up “sandwich” in a
dictionary and accepting its definition as “two thin pieces of
bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese,
or savory mixture) spread between them.”91
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2011).
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384-85.
88 Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/
scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism.
90 White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rest., LLC, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 565
(Mass. Supp. 2006).
91 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2011 (1993) (defining
“sandwich”).
86
87
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This is a very limited notion of sandwich, though. As
Posner asks, what about a club sandwich, or an open-faced
sandwich? But there are even bigger problems. Are wraps
sandwiches under the lease? If so, then it will be hard to
distinguish between a wrap and a burrito, since the former is
derivative of the latter.92 The two are visually very similar,
suggesting that their main difference may be how our culture
perceives them, rather than physical characteristics subject to
definition.93 If the court were to limit itself to the dictionary
definition, then submarine sandwich shops would also be
permitted. Much more can be said about what constitutes a
sandwich at the margins, but even these few examples suggest
that it is a less simple feat than one might think. And once one
gets that far, one must decide whether the parties intended to
restrict only prototypical sandwiches, or sandwiches as broadly
construed. Among the arguments set forth by the judge was the
fact that there were Mexican restaurants near the shopping
center, suggesting that if the tenant wished to require their
preclusion, it would have said so. Does this mean that context
trumps ordinary meaning, that ordinary meaning is hard to
discover, or that it is not a simple matter to decide whether to
commit to the prototype or to the broad interpretation of
statutory language, absent contextual information? I believe it
illustrates all three of these contingencies.94
For similar reasons, even where a uniform methodology
has been established, there may be little consensus about how to
apply it in individual cases. Thus, in Wisconsin, where a
hierarchy of considerations has been judicially established,95 it is
not clear how much this consensus can bring about agreement
among judges as to the proper result in an individual litigation.
The Wisconsin court leaves a lot to be decided on a case-by-case
basis, a point Chief Justice Abrahamson made in her concurring
opinion.96 For instance, it is not clear how uncertain meaning
92 The Wikipedia entry for “sandwich wrap” recites this history. sandwich wrap,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandwich_wrap (last updated Nov. 7, 2013).
93 See Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class,
and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 32 (2008) (perceptively asking,
“Does a Burrito Have a Race?”). For a good summary of the arguments in the case and
their broader interpretive ramifications, see CHRISTOPHER HUTTON, WORD MEANING
AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 91-94 (forthcoming 2014).
94 For further discussion of the selection between ordinary and definitional
meaning, see SOLAN, supra note 7, ch. 3; see also Brian C. Slocum, Linguistics and
‘Ordinary Meaning’ Determinations, 33 STATUTE L. REV. 39 (2012).
95 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County (In re Criminal
Complaint), 681 N.W.2d 110, 122-27 (Wis. 2004), discussed supra note 11.
96 Id. at 127-28 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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must be before a judge declares a statute ambiguous, triggering
further inquiry. Although the court defines ambiguity, it proposes
an objective test without indicating which facts should feed the
analysis. The court says:
It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory
meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the
statute “to determine whether ‘well-informed persons should
have become confused,’ that is, whether the statutory . . . language
reasonably gives rise to different meanings.”97

Thus, judges, using their own intuitions about meaning,
will have to decide what makes an interpretation a reasonable
one. This is not always an impossible task. However, individual
judges, as speakers of English, have their own sense of a term’s
meaning. Without knowing the extent to which people reasonably
disagree with one another on the application of a word in
borderline cases—such as the ones litigated at the appellate court
level—there will likely not be consensus on whether a statutory
term is ambiguous or not, thus triggering disagreement about
which tools are appropriate to use in an individual case.98
Gluck recognizes that there is a difference between
agreeing on methodology and agreeing on the results of that
methodology’s application in individual cases. Scalia and Garner
likewise emphasize that recognition of an appropriate
interpretive method is not sufficient to render interpretive
decisions easy ones. This, they correctly point out, stems from the
fact that so many statutory adjudications involve the resolution of
borderline cases, which are by their very nature close calls.
CONCLUSION: SHOULD WE GIVE IT A TRY?
Where does all of this leave us? It is both possible and
feasible to assemble a Restatement that recites most of what
statutory interpreters do every day in cases that are largely not
controversial. This would accomplish quite a bit. It would in
essence, be a more complete version of what Scalia and Garner
have attempted—i.e., cataloging and illustrating legitimate
canons—and a manageable replacement of Sutherland, based

Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (majority opinion).
For discussion of this pervasive problem, see Lawrence M. Solan, Terri
Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts
and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2004).
97
98
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on a more modern taxonomy of issues, along the lines that
O’Connor suggested.99
But there are problems, and the problems are magnified
by the prestige of the ALI Restatements. For one thing, while
there is general consensus about the basic elements of statutory
interpretation (putting aside the nagging battles over the use of
legislative history), there is no consensus about the hierarchy of
the various categories. Although there is consensus about such
things as the role of the canons of interpretation as a general
matter, there is no generally accepted practice for preferring one
canon over another. Furthermore, so much of statutory
interpretation focuses on the meaning of statutory language.
There is no consensus about how to find that meaning, with
judges applying competing methods without even acknowledging
the problem. Making matters more difficult, there is little reason
for a Restatement to insist upon one meaning over another.
Sometimes, a broad interpretation of words seems appropriate,
at other times a narrow one. These are not the only problems
that drafters of a new Restatement will face, but they are
daunting ones.
What is both true and troubling about the prospect of a
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation is this defense of the
project by Gary O’Connor:
The Restatement process may be able to provide the “time-honored
acceptance” that scholarly work by individuals may not be able to
provide. Restatements are familiar to almost all attorneys. In many
areas of law, such as torts and especially contracts, they have a high
degree of acceptance with courts. A Restatement could serve as a
bridge between the scholarly and judicial worlds in this area and
provide a means for scholarly canons to gain judicial acceptance.100

Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice is
obviously a laudable goal. But there are many ways to build a
bridge. The bridge that provides methodology to a judge wishing
to do things “right” and that actually enables that judge to judge
according to a widely accepted set of jurisprudential values is one
that both judges and practitioners will welcome enthusiastically.
In contrast, the bridge that gives judges exercising discretion in
accordance with their own values the opportunity to take further
cover in authoritative material may not be a bridge to nowhere,
but it is not a bridge worth building. A new Restatement will by
its very nature build both kinds of bridges, and will have no
99
100

See O’Connor, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Id. at 359.
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mechanism for forcing any given judge to traverse one bridge or
the other in any given case.
My sense, then, is that a Restatement is feasible, and
would have value. But it is also likely to become yet another
vehicle for supporting one or another argument in controversial
cases. This reluctance is bolstered by the fact that similar
problems occur with the interpretive sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, although the problems are not as severe.
For example, Section 213 contains the parol evidence rule, which
says that prior agreements that are inconsistent with an
integrated written agreement are inoperative.101 The well-known
problem with this rule is how to determine whether the prior
agreement is inconsistent with the current one. The more closely
one examines contextual information the less work is being
accomplished by the parol evidence rule itself. Thus, some states
employ a “hard parol evidence rule” by which little or no
contextual analysis is permitted if the language appears plain
on its face, while others employ a “soft parol evidence rule” by
which courts conduct an examination of the language in
context as a preliminary matter when the parol evidence rule is
adduced.102
Other interpretive sections do not enjoy the wide
acceptance and prestige that the Restatement generally carries.
For example, Section 211 excludes from standardized
agreements terms that are outside the reasonable expectations
of the non-drafting party.103 This section is not widely applied by
courts104 outside the interpretation of insurance policies, and
even there the results are mixed.105 Similarly, Section 201(3)106
states that when the parties do not understand the language of a
contract the same way, and neither party has taken advantage
of the other’s different understanding, then there is no contract.
This has been the result in some celebrated cases, which make

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
For discussion of these doctrinal choices, see Russell Korobkin, The Borat
Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard
Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (2013); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the
Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
533, 536 (1998).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
104 See, e.g., Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 2005).
105 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998).
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(3) (1981).
101
102
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their way into every contracts casebook.107 But the courts are
generally reluctant to hold that there is no contract when both
parties believe that there is one.
On the other hand, there are some doctrines of contract
law that are far better-established than are their counterparts
in the realm of statutory interpretation.108 Chief among them is
Section 203, which dictates a hierarchy of extrinsic evidence.109
This is exactly what is missing in the canons of statutory
interpretation: a ranking of various canons. The difference, no
doubt, lies in the fact that there are comparatively few players
in the contract formation process, and a limit to the kinds of
historical information likely to be relevant: the history between
the parties, the usage in the trade, and so on. Even in this wellestablished realm of contract law, however, recent empirical
scholarship by Lisa Bernstein suggests that the evidence
presented to courts is sufficiently uneven to undermine
consistent decision making.110
There is consensus significant enough to motivate serious
consideration of a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation.
However, there are obstacles to creating universal procedures in
statutory interpretation, and even greater obstacles to creating
procedures that are both universal and reliable in producing the
same result regardless of who applies them. How can there be so
much agreement about how to go about an activity and so little
107 See Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
108 Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998).
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203. Standards of Preference in
Interpretation. In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the
following standards of preference are generally applicable:

(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning
to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect;
(b) express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course
of dealing, and usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight
than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of dealing is given
greater weight than usage of trade;
(c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general
language;
(d) separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than
standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated.
110 Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and
Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy (Univ. of Chicago Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 452), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366533.
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agreement about what the process should produce? My own sense
is that statutory interpretation becomes a self-conscious
enterprise only in hard cases. The major doctrines of contract,
torts, property, and so many of the restated areas of law, in
contrast, are about all cases. Contract interpretation, however, is
very much like statutory interpretation, albeit with fewer
institutional issues arising. That is why the interpretive portions
of the Restatement of Contracts are so problematic, in the context
of a project that has, for decades, been rightly seen as a
resounding success. That is also why a useful Restatement of
Statutory Interpretation would be a difficult task to accomplish.

